Civil Appeals >> Civil & Consumer Law   |   Property/Real Estate Law >> Property & Real Estate  

This case of V.S.R. Mohan Rao v/s K.S.R. Murthy & Others revolves around an appeal challenging a Special Court's decision to evict the appellant, who was accused of being a "land grabber" and occupying a property he claimed to have acquired through a sale deed in 1997. The original applicant before the Special Court, a private individual, asserted that the appellant had illegally occupied 252 square yards of her land, which she purchased in 1965, forming part of Survey No. 9 in Saroornagar Village.

The appellant's legal counsel, Smt. Madhvi Diwan, argued that the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, was improperly invoked. She contended that if any wrongdoing occurred, it was a simple trespass, not "land grabbing," which requires obvious criminality and mens rea (criminal intent). The appellant maintained he had bona fide purchased the property, and his title was derived from a Housing Society, with a two-story building already existing on the land. He also suggested that his predecessors-in-interest might have perfected title through adverse possession. The counsel cited the Supreme Court's decision in Konda Lakshmana Bapuji v. Govt. of A.P. to support her argument on the constricted scope of the Act, asserting that the remedy should lie in a civil court, not a summary trial under the Land Grabbing Act.

Conversely, the respondents, legal heirs of the original applicant, argued that a court-appointed Commissioner confirmed the appellant's encroachment into the applicant's property in Survey No. 9, despite the appellant's sale deed showing his property in Survey No. 10. They also highlighted that two injunction suits filed by the appellant (one against the applicant and one against the Municipality) were unsuccessful.

The Supreme Court, referring to Konda Lakshmana Bapuji, affirmed that the term "land grabbing" under the Act encompasses both forcible, violent, and unscrupulous taking of land, as well as unauthorized, greedy, or unfair possession. Crucially, the Court agreed that the mens rea required is only the intention of illegally taking possession of land through unlawful means, including for creating third-party rights or unauthorized construction. The Court reiterated that while an allegation of land grabbing is necessary to initiate proceedings, proof of ownership by the applicant is paramount, at which point the burden of proof shifts to the alleged land grabber.

In this specific case, the Court found that:

• The applicant clearly asserted her ownership of the land in Survey No. 9 with a registered sale deed.
• The Commission Report unequivocally identified the property in the appellant's possession as being in Survey No. 9, not Survey No. 10.
• The appellant's prior injunction suits against the applicant and the Municipality regarding the same property were dismissed or withdrawn, further undermining his claim.
• The appellant failed to provide proof regarding the commencement and completion of construction on the land to support his claim of adverse possession.

The Supreme Court concluded that the ingredients for "land grabbing" were pleaded and adequately proven by the applicant. The Court found no reason to interfere with the lower court's judgment, emphasizing that the Land Grabbing Act aims for a speedy inquiry and trial of land grabbing cases, with its courts acting as civil courts capable of granting similar reliefs.

The appeal was therefore dismissed.