Appellate Court Errs in Granting Injunction to Tenant's Daughter.


04 July 2025 Dispute with Tenant/Landlord >> Property & Real Estate  

This case of Shimna Engineering Pvt. Ltd. v/s Subhika Singh & Another, stemming from an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, concerns a dispute over an ad interim injunction in a property suit. The core issue revolves around whether the daughter of a tenant, claiming to be in possession of a property, can seek an injunction to protect that possession.

Initially, the plaintiff (the tenant's daughter) filed a suit for permanent injunction against the defendants, seeking protection from dispossession without due process. She also sought an ad interim injunction, which the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Second Court at Alipore, refused on May 8, 2025.


 

 

Aggrieved by this refusal, the plaintiff appealed to the learned District Judge, 24 Parganas (South) at Alipore. The appellate court, in its order dated May 15, 2025, reversed the trial court's decision and granted an ad interim order directing the parties to maintain status quo regarding possession and usage, specifically ingress and egress to the property.

The second defendant then challenged this appellate court order before the High Court (the present application under Article 227).

Arguments Presented:

For the Defendant (Petitioner): Mr. Basu, learned Senior Advocate, argued that the suit by the tenant's daughter was not maintainable as she claimed no personal right or interest in the property, only seeking to protect a third party's (her father's) rights. He contended that the trial court's reasoned refusal to grant an injunction should not have been easily overturned by the appellate court, citing Supreme Court and High Court precedents (Skyline Education Institute (India) Private Limited vs. S.L. Vaswani and Another, and Calcutta Swimming Club vs. Lalit Singh & Ors.). He emphasized that the original tenant had not filed the suit.

For the Plaintiff (Opposite Party): Mr. Sabyasachi Chowdhury, learned Senior Advocate, countered that the plaintiff, living in joint mess with her ailing father (the tenant), had a right to enjoy the property and prevent forcible dispossession. He argued the suit was maintainable under Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, asserting that the plaintiff, as a licensee of the tenant, had a right to protect her possession. He presented documents like her Voter ID and Driving License to show long-term occupation and cited Supreme Court decisions (Sunkamma (Dead) By legal representatives vs. S. Pusparaj (Dead) by legal representatives, and Lakshmi Alias Bhagyalakshmi and another vs. E. Jayaram (Dead) by L.R.) to support the maintainability of a suit based on lawful possession, not necessarily ownership, and protection against eviction without due process.

Court's Observations and Decision:

The High Court meticulously reviewed the arguments and precedents. It reaffirmed that granting an injunction is a discretionary power of the court, requiring a strong prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury, as established in Shiv Kumar Chadha vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi. Crucially, the maintainability of the suit is a prerequisite for granting an injunction.

The Court found that the plaintiff (tenant's daughter) failed to establish any legal right or interest in the property in her favour. She was neither a tenant nor a direct licensee, and her claim was based on her father's tenancy. The Court reiterated that family members of a tenant generally do not acquire independent rights in the tenanted property. It also held that simply possessing a Voter ID or Driving License for a long period does not grant property rights.

The High Court distinguished the precedents cited by the plaintiff, stating that they applied to tenants protecting their own lawful possession, which was not the case here. It also found that the plaintiff's "possession" did not meet the criteria of "settled possession" as defined by the Supreme Court in Puran Singh's case (referred to in Rama Gowda vs. M. Varadappa Naidu), as mere occupation as an agent or servant of a third party does not equate to actual physical possession or lawful possession.

Ultimately, the High Court concluded that the suit was prima facie not maintainable by the plaintiff, as she had not asserted a personal right that was infringed or threatened. It held that the learned Trial Judge had rightly exercised discretion in refusing the injunction based on objective considerations. Therefore, the appellate court erred in interfering with the trial court's well-reasoned order, especially when its own finding of "settled possession" by the plaintiff was flawed.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the Civil Revision Application (CO 1811 of 2025), setting aside the District Judge's order dated May 15, 2025.