Balancing Procedural Rigour and Substantive Justice: Condonation of Delay in Filing Additional Written Statements.


07 November 2025 Commercial Suit >> Civil & Consumer Law   |   Interim Application >> Civil & Consumer Law  

In a recent decision of The Board of Mumbai Port Authority v/s Halani Star & Others, the Court considered whether delay in filing an additional written statement in a commercial suit could be condoned as falling within the discretion of the Court, notwithstanding the strict procedural framework brought in by virtue of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The case offers an instructive guidance on the dividing line between the mandatory nature of Rule 1 of Order VIII and the relatively flexible scope of Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

The Applicant, Defendant No. 2, sought condonation of delay of 684 days in filing an additional written statement in response to an amended plaint. Though a written statement to the original plaint had been filed in time, after the plaint was amended and additional claims were incorporated, the Defendant did not file its additional written statement within a period of three weeks extended by the Court. The delay was principally explained on the ground that the Defendant was busy contesting an application for summary judgment filed by the Plaintiff, which ultimately came to be rejected.

 

 

Counsel appearing for the Applicant-respondent argued that while Order VIII Rule 9 prescribes a thirty-day period within which an additional written statement may be filed, it does not contain the same inflexible restrictions as are contained in Rule 1, extending time to file the original written statement to a maximum of 120 days. The Court's attention was drawn to precedents recognizing judicial discretion in exceptional cases where refusal to grant a further extension would result in grave injustice.

The Plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that in view of the decision in SCG Contracts (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., the timelines for filing pleadings in commercial suits are mandatory and no extension is permissible beyond the statutory limits. It was, thus, contended that similar restrictions ought to apply to subsequent pleadings as well.

On the basis of an analysis of the relevant provisions and judicial authorities, the Court held that the restrictive provisos introduced by the Commercial Courts Act apply strictly to Order VIII Rule 1 but not to Rule 9, leaving room for judicial discretion. It was held by the Court that Rule 9 is directory and not mandatory since time can be extended in exceptional circumstances for sufficient cause shown. Such discretion, however, must be exercised cautiously, and delays resulting from mere negligence or indifference cannot be condoned.

Applying these principles, the Court held that the delay of 684 days was sufficiently explained. The Defendant’s involvement in another, yet related summary judgment proceeding was an exceptional circumstance. As the issues had not been yet framed and the trial was pending, no prejudice would be caused to the Plaintiff by the filing of the additional written statement. However, to prevent misusing judicial discretion and to compensate the Plaintiff for inconvenience, costs of Rs. 1,00,000 were imposed as a condition for condonation. 

This ruling has underlined an important procedural difference: while the Commercial Courts Act requires strict adherence to timetables in the case of initial pleadings, the Courts may still afford measured flexibility in regard to subsequent pleadings under Order VIII, Rule 9. The judgment reinforces the principle that procedural law serves as a handmaid to justice and that rigid adherence to form cannot override substantive fairness where sufficient cause is convincingly shown.


COMMERCIAL COURTS ACT, 2015  

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908