In a recent ruling in LBN v/s VJK under the Family Courts Act of 1984, the complexities of residential rights amid divorce proceedings were brought to light. The case, stemming from a divorce petition filed by the appellant husband, focused on his plea to direct his estranged wife to vacate a tenanted property deemed unsafe due to extensive deterioration. This appeal raises significant questions regarding the interplay of various legal provisions governing domestic and family disputes.

The appellant initiated his plea on February 12, 2024, citing urgent repairs needed in the tenanted premises located in Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi. He asserted that the building's condition rendered it uninhabitable, prompting his request for the respondent wife to relocate to alternate accommodation he was willing to provide. However, the Family Court dismissed his application, asserting that the appellant’s request did not fall within the purview of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) and suggested that his remedy lay under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (DV Act).

The appellant’s counsel argued that the Family Court misinterpreted the applicability of the law. They contended that, without an existing order under the DV Act regarding residential rights, the husband was left without recourse. The contention hinged on the assertion that the matter of residence is integral to maintenance claims, particularly relevant as the respondent had sought maintenance under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act (HMA).

In contrast, the respondent's counsel maintained that the appellant should pursue remedies specifically outlined in the DV Act or as part of the ongoing maintenance proceedings under the HMA. They emphasized that the Family Court’s jurisdiction was limited concerning requests for eviction.

The Family Court acknowledged the wife's right to seek residential accommodation through several legal avenues, including the HMA and the DV Act. However, it denied the husband’s application, stating that such requests should not be entertained under the current divorce petition.

Critically, the appellate court evaluated whether the husband had any specific statutory remedy. Notably, while Section 19 of the DV Act empowers the court to issue residence orders, the appellant lacked the standing to invoke this provision directly, as only an aggrieved woman qualifies under the Act.

Upon reviewing the arguments, the appellate court determined that the Family Court had erred in dismissing the husband's application outright. It noted that the nature of the appeal warranted examination under Section 151 of the CPC, emphasizing that every civil court possesses the inherent power to issue necessary orders when existing statutes do not provide clear guidance.

In conclusion, the appellate court set aside the Family Court's dismissal, instructing a reevaluation of the application within four weeks. This case underscores the need for clear legal pathways in family disputes, particularly concerning residential rights during divorce proceedings. It also illustrates the court's role in balancing rights and responsibilities in complex personal circumstances, reinforcing the importance of adaptability in family law jurisprudence.

As the legal landscape evolves, cases like this highlight the intricate balance between statutory provisions and the need for judicial intervention in matters of domestic welfare. The ruling not only clarifies the applicability of various legal frameworks but also reinforces the imperative for a thorough examination of all parties' rights in family law disputes.