Consensual Relationship Cannot Be Painted as Rape on False Promise: Supreme Court Quashes Charges Against Former Judicial Officer.


07 April 2025 Criminal Appeals & Suspension of Sentence >> Criminal Law   |   FIR >> Criminal Law  

The Supreme Court of India in the matter of Biswajyoti Chatterjee v/s State of West Bengal & Another., has delivered a significant judgment, emphasizing that a consensual relationship, even if it involves a promise of marriage that is not fulfilled, cannot automatically be categorized as rape under the false pretext of marriage. The apex court allowed a Special Leave Petition filed by a former judicial officer, setting aside an order of the Calcutta High Court that had refused to discharge him in a 2015 FIR alleging rape, cheating, and criminal intimidation.

The case stemmed from a complaint filed by a woman (Respondent No. 2) who alleged that she came into contact with the Appellant, then an Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (ACJM), Haldia, during the pendency of her divorce proceedings in 2014. The complainant alleged that the Appellant, who was separated from his wife, had promised to marry her and take responsibility for her and her son. Based on this assurance, they allegedly entered into a physical relationship on multiple occasions. However, after the complainant's divorce was finalized, the Appellant allegedly avoided her and refused to marry her.


 

 

Following an investigation, a chargesheet was filed against the Appellant under Sections 376 (rape), 417 (cheating), and 506 (criminal intimidation) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The Appellant's applications for discharge before the Sessions Court and subsequently before the High Court were dismissed.

In its judgment, the Supreme Court meticulously examined the allegations and the complainant's statements. The court noted that the complainant was a 36-year-old mature adult with an 11-year-old child, and she was fully aware that the Appellant was a 56-year-old married man, albeit separated from his wife, from the inception of their relationship. The court highlighted that the complainant had received financial assistance from the Appellant and had consciously chosen to continue the relationship despite this knowledge.

Drawing upon precedents, particularly the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court reiterated that for "consent" in a sexual act to be vitiated by a "misconception of fact" arising from a promise to marry, two conditions must be met: the promise must have been false from its inception, made in bad faith with no intention of being fulfilled, and this false promise must have a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act.

The court opined that even if the complainant's allegations were taken at face value, it was improbable that she engaged in a physical relationship solely based on the promise of marriage, especially knowing the Appellant's marital status. The court cited the case of Prashant Bharti Vs State of NCT of Delhi, emphasizing that it is "inconceivable" for a woman to maintain a prolonged association and physical relationship without voluntary consent.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court referred to Uday Vs State of Karnataka, where the court had acquitted an accused, noting that a mature college student's consent to sexual intercourse with someone she loved, based on a promise of marriage, could not be considered consent under a misconception of fact. The court reiterated that while there is no fixed formula for determining the voluntariness of consent, the surrounding circumstances and the prosecutrix's understanding of the situation are crucial.

Regarding the charge of cheating under Section 417 IPC, the Supreme Court found no evidence of fraudulent or dishonest inducement. The court noted the absence of any record establishing "inducement" or "enticement" by the Appellant, especially since the complainant was aware of his personal and professional background. Similarly, the court found the allegations of criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC based on a "bare allegation" of threat to be insufficient.

The court also pointed out inconsistencies in the complainant's statements regarding the introduction to her lawyer, casting doubt on her overall narrative, although it acknowledged that this did not negate the consensual nature of the relationship.

In a significant observation, the Supreme Court expressed concern about the "growing tendency of resorting to initiation of criminal proceedings when relationships turn sour." The court stated that "every consensual relationship, where a possibility of marriage may exist, cannot be given a colour of a false pretext to marry, in the event of a fall out." Such cases, the court asserted, amount to an abuse of the process of law, warranting the termination of proceedings even at the stage of charge.

Considering that the incident occurred in 2014 and further litigation would only prolong the suffering of both parties who have moved on with their lives, the Supreme Court deemed it in the interest of justice to quash the proceedings. Consequently, the court set aside the Calcutta High Court's order and allowed the former judicial officer's appeal.

This judgment serves as a crucial reminder that the existence of a physical relationship between consenting adults, even when accompanied by a promise of marriage that is later broken, does not automatically constitute the offense of rape. The court's emphasis on the woman's awareness, maturity, and voluntary participation in the relationship underscores the importance of distinguishing between a broken promise and a deliberate false representation made to induce sexual intercourse.


Section 164., Code of Criminal Procedure - 1973  

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973  

Section 376., Indian Penal Code - 1860     

Section 417., Indian Penal Code - 1860  

Section 506., Indian Penal Code - 1860  

Indian Penal Code, 1860