04 April 2025 Consumer Protection Act >> Consumer Rights  

In Birender Kumar Singh v/s Tata Memorial Centre & Another., the dismissal of a consumer complaint filed under Section 21 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, alleging deficiency in service by two Opposite Party hospitals. The complainant claimed misdiagnosis of cancer, leading to incorrect treatment, including chemotherapy and surgical removal of the pancreas, and sought substantial compensation.

The complainant initially experienced stomach discomfort in June 2016 and underwent various tests at local facilities, which indicated a mass in the pancreatic head. He then consulted Ruby Hall Clinic (Opposite Party No. 2) in Pune, where an EUS-guided FNAC test diagnosed the mass as "malignant cells Adenocarcinoma" (pancreatic cancer). Opposite Party No. 2 initially recommended chemotherapy followed by surgery.

Seeking a second opinion, the complainant visited Opposite Party No. 1 hospital (a renowned cancer treatment center) in Mumbai. Opposite Party No. 1 reviewed Opposite Party No. 2's FNAC slides, concurred with the adenocarcinoma diagnosis, and commenced chemotherapy without conducting fresh FNAC or tissue biopsy. After four cycles of chemotherapy, and despite the lesion's continued growth, more chemotherapy and then radiation were administered. Ultimately, on February 14, 2017, Opposite Party No. 1 performed surgery to remove the pancreas.

The crucial point of the complaint arose from the final histopathology report of the removed pancreas dated March 17, 2017, which surprisingly showed "solid cystic papillary endocrine neoplasm (SPEN) of head pancreas" and stated that the "pancreatic remnant was unremarkable," implying no malignancy. The complainant argued that this indicated misdiagnosis and unwarranted, harmful treatment.

Opposite Party No. 1 vehemently denied medical negligence, stating that their doctors exercised the best possible care and skills. They contended that both adenocarcinoma and SPEN are tumors of the pancreatic head, often presenting similar features, and that the treatment protocol (chemotherapy followed by surgery) would have been the same for both conditions, especially given the tumor's size and involvement of surrounding structures. They also emphasized that chemotherapy and radiotherapy are not contraindicated for SPEN and can reduce recurrence potential. Opposite Party No. 1 argued that the complainant, a layman, lacked the expertise to conclude misdiagnosis and that his allegations were not supported by expert evidence.

Opposite Party No. 2 stated that no specific allegations were made or relief claimed against them in the complaint, though they denied any deficiency in their diagnostic or treatment services.

The court, applying the principles of medical negligence established in Jacob Mathew vs. State of Punjab & Anr. (based on the Bolam Test), noted that to prove negligence, there must be a demonstration of breach of the standard of care resulting in loss or damage. A simple error of judgment or an unfavorable patient outcome does not automatically constitute negligence. The standard of care is judged based on the knowledge available at the time of the incident, and a doctor is not liable if they follow an acceptable medical practice.

The court found that the complainant's allegation of misdiagnosis rested on the premise that Opposite Party No. 1 did not conduct fresh tests and that the post-surgery histopathology report differed from the initial diagnosis. However, Opposite Party No. 1 presented medical literature indicating that the line of treatment for both SPEN and adenocarcinoma is similar. The court emphasized that the complainant failed to provide any expert opinion or medical literature to substantiate his claim that the adopted treatment protocol was inappropriate for adenocarcinoma or that the subsequent SPEN diagnosis necessarily implied misdiagnosis or negligence given the overlapping treatment approaches.

Therefore, the court concluded that the complainant had not met the criteria to establish medical negligence, as he failed to provide evidence of a breach in the standard of care that caused him damage. The complaint was dismissed with no order as to costs.

  Section 21, Consumer Protection Act - 1986  

  Consumer Protection Act, 1986