25 July 2025 Civil Appeals >> Civil & Consumer Law  

In a significant ruling of Manoj Kumar Singh v/s State of West Bengal & Others, the Calcutta High Court has set aside an order by the District Inspector of Schools (Secondary Education), Barrackpore, North 24 Parganas, and directed the immediate approval of a panel for the appointment of Group-D staff at Nimta High School (H.S.). The decision comes after a protracted legal battle, emphasizing the binding nature of prior court orders and the need for adherence to recruitment rules prevalent at the time of initial process commencement.

The case revolves around a writ petition challenging the DI's order dated May 8, 2013, which rejected the approval of a panel for Group-D staff. The petitioner, the top candidate on the said panel, sought to quash this order and secure an appointment letter.

Background of the Dispute:

The saga began in 2000 when Nimta High School obtained permission from the DI to fill a Group-D staff position. An initial interview was held in November 2000, but the results were postponed. A decade later, on February 17, 2010, the DI granted fresh permission for a "re-interview" for two vacant posts. Crucially, this letter specified that the re-interview should involve the same set of candidates along with those sponsored from the "live register" under the "died-in-harness" category. Following this, an interview process was conducted, and a panel was prepared and forwarded to the DI on April 9, 2010.

The petitioner had previously approached the High Court due to the DI's inaction on the panel. On June 25, 2012, the Court directed the DI to consider and pass a reasoned order on the panel's approval, explicitly stating that the recruitment rules prevailing when the process began in 2000 should be considered. The impugned order of May 8, 2013, was the result of this directive.

DI's Contention and Petitioner's Rebuttal:

In the contested order, the DI deemed the panel improper, asserting that the Group-D vacancy was a "1st Stage" vacancy and should only be filled by candidates from the "died-in-harness" category whose names were registered in the DI's "live register," as per a notification dated December 15, 2008.

The petitioner's counsel, Mr. Saibal Acharyya, strongly argued against this. He highlighted two previous High Court orders:

• June 27, 2000 (W.P. No. 8505(w) of 2000): This order permitted the current petitioner to appear for the Group-D staff interview, subject to eligibility.
• June 25, 2012 (W.P. 4536(W) of 2012): This order specifically directed the DI to consider the panel based on the recruitment rules prevalent in 2000 when the selection process initiated.

Mr. Acharyya contended that both these orders had attained finality, were unchallenged, and were binding on all parties. He argued that the DI's reliance on the 2008 notification was not only in contravention of the Court's directive to apply 2000 rules but also an unlawful retrospective application of a new rule. He cited judgments in Nomita Chowdhury Vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors. and P. Mahendram and Others Vs. State of Karnataka and Others to support his arguments against retrospective application and the binding nature of court orders.

State's Defense and Court's Observations:

Mr. Pritam Chaudhury, representing the State, raised strong objections. He referred to a January 7, 2000 order from the DI, which sponsored three "died-in-harness" candidates from the "live register," none of whom was the petitioner. He emphasized the 2008 notification, asserting that the vacancy was a "1st stage" vacancy reserved for "died-in-harness" candidates and that the petitioner lacked the requisite eligibility. He also argued that merely being empaneled does not confer a vested right to appointment if the selection process itself is flawed in terms of eligibility. He further contended that the DI's February 17, 2010 letter, which allowed "re-interview" with the same candidates, was issued by "mistake of fact."

The Court, however, found the State's arguments unconvincing. It noted that the petitioner's participation in the interview process was permitted by a prior court order, effectively waiving any alleged ineligibility. The Court referenced Abani Mahato Vs. Kanchan K. Sinha and Others, where the Supreme Court held that a panel cannot be challenged on grounds of ineligibility if the candidate was allowed to participate by court order and succeeded.

Crucially, the High Court observed that the State had never raised the issue of the petitioner's ineligibility or the "died-in-harness" category in its previous interactions with the Court in 2000 or 2012. The Court deemed this a "belated" plea to justify the DI's impugned decision. Furthermore, the Court questioned the State's assertion that the vacancy was automatically a "1st stage" vacancy in a 100-point roster without providing any substantiation.

Regarding the "mistake of fact" plea concerning the February 17, 2010 letter, the Court found no material evidence to suggest any corrective action was taken since its issuance. Instead, the re-interview was conducted based on that very letter, and a panel was forwarded.

Court's Ruling:

The High Court concluded that the DI, having been bound by prior unchallenged and final court orders, had no scope to independently question the petitioner's eligibility. The Court found the DI's impugned order of May 8, 2013, to be arbitrary, illegal, and a clear non-application of mind, particularly for failing to consider the recruitment rules prevalent in 2000 as explicitly directed.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the writ petition and issued the following directives:

1. The impugned order of the DI dated May 8, 2013, is set aside.
2. The DI is directed to immediately approve the panel for the Group-D staff post in Nimta High School (H.S.) in accordance with the recruitment rules prevalent at the time of the recruitment process's initiation in 2000.
3. Following the DI's approval, the school authority shall immediately issue an appointment letter to the first empanelled candidate.

The entire process must be completed within eight weeks from the date of communication of the order. This ruling reinforces the principle of judicial finality and the imperative for authorities to comply with court directives in a timely and lawful manner.