The petitioner, a manufacturer of ADCOTE 545S—an adhesive used in various packaging applications—challenged the seizure of its product by customs authorities. The petition initially sought a declaration that the petitioner was not required to obtain a No Objection Certificate (NOC) from the Narcotics Commissioner, as the product was not listed under Schedule-B of the 2013 Order. However, during the proceedings, the first respondent issued a show cause notice requiring the petitioner to justify why its product should not be confiscated and penalized for violating the export control provisions.

Representing the petitioner, Mr. Amit Singh contended that while ADCOTE 545S contained Methyl Ethyl Ketone (MEK)—a controlled substance listed under Entry 10 of Schedule-B—it was not a product that could be classified as MEK. He emphasized that Schedule-B specifically includes only certain substances, their salts, or preparations, and argued that the product should not be construed as MEK, even if it contained a certain proportion of the chemical. According to Mr. Singh, the inclusion of certain salts and preparations in Schedule-B was explicitly stated in the order, but MEK was not mentioned in such terms, indicating that preparations containing MEK should not be subjected to the NOC requirement.

On the other hand, Mr. Subir Kumar, representing the respondents, argued that the issue at hand required a thorough investigation into the factual nature of the product. He pointed out that while ADCOTE 545S may not be MEK per se, it contained significant quantities of the substance, which could be extracted or distilled. Mr. Kumar referred to the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), which grants the Central Government powers to regulate controlled substances, asserting that any substance containing MEK falls under the regulatory regime of the NDPS Act. He suggested that a show cause notice was entirely valid, as the issue was not merely legal but also factual, requiring further investigation by the appropriate authorities.

The Court observed that the core issue in the case was whether ADCOTE 545S fell within the ambit of Schedule-B, which lists controlled substances like MEK. Given the complexity of the case, which involved interpreting chemical substances and their interactions, the Court determined that the matter required an investigation into the factual aspects—something beyond the purview of a writ court.

The Court acknowledged that while the petitioner’s argument had merit, the interpretation of Schedule-B and the chemical composition of ADCOTE 545S necessitated expert examination. Moreover, since the 2013 Order was made under Section 9-A of the NDPS Act, which allows for the regulation of substances based on their use in narcotic drug production, the Court held that such matters are best left to the appropriate authorities.

The Court ultimately decided that the show cause notice issued to the petitioner should not be interfered with at this stage. The petitioner was directed to respond to the show cause notice within four weeks, and all further adjudication on the matter was to be handled by the relevant authorities. The Court emphasized that the petitioner had the opportunity to raise all its objections during the adjudicatory process, and no exceptional circumstances justified bypassing the statutory process.

The ruling echoed several precedents in Indian law, where courts have consistently upheld the principle of exhausting statutory remedies before approaching the judiciary. In Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks (1998), the Supreme Court highlighted that writ petitions challenging show cause notices should only be entertained in exceptional cases—such as when a lack of jurisdiction is clear or when principles of natural justice are violated. Further, in Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. v. Chairman Central Board, Direct Taxes (2004), the Court discouraged premature intervention in the adjudicatory process, noting that the petitioner could raise its issues in the appropriate forum.

In Special Director and Another v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse (2004), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the writ court should not interfere in matters of show cause notices unless the jurisdiction of the authorities is patently invalid.

The Court's decision in this case reinforces the importance of adhering to statutory procedures and processes, particularly in regulatory matters involving controlled substances. The ruling highlights the distinction between legal challenges and factual investigations, stressing that courts should not encroach upon the expertise of specialized authorities when it comes to the technical evaluation of chemical substances.

While the petitioner’s legal arguments were carefully considered, the Court ultimately upheld the principle that challenges to show cause notices should be resolved through the statutory framework, rather than judicial intervention at the initial stage. This case underscores the judiciary’s reluctance to bypass the established administrative processes and the need for parties to exhaust available remedies before seeking court intervention.