Delhi High Court Clarifies Powers of Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities in Transfer Cases.


02 April 2025 Civil Appeals >> Civil & Consumer Law  

The Delhi High Court, in a recent judgment, has clarified the extent of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities' (CCPD) powers, particularly concerning service-related matters like employee transfers. The ruling came in the case of Mukesh Kumar v/s National Power Training Institute & Others (LPA. No. 980 of 2024), decided on April 2, 2025, by Chief Justice Mr. Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela.

The case involved an appeal filed by Mukesh Kumar, a Deputy Director (T/F) with the National Power Training Institute (respondent no. 1), who suffers from 70% locomotor disability. Kumar was transferred from Faridabad to Durgapur in "public interest" on June 19, 2024. He subsequently filed a complaint with the CCPD, alleging frequent, mala fide transfers that amounted to harassment of a person with disability (PwD). On August 2, 2024, the CCPD directed the National Power Training Institute to keep the transfer order in abeyance pending the matter. This order was later set aside by a learned Single Judge on September 2, 2024, leading to the current appeal.

 
 
 
 

The core issues before the High Court were:

  • The extent of CCPD's powers and jurisdiction under Section 75 read with Section 76 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (2016 Act), particularly its ability to interfere in service-related matters such as transfers.
  • Whether orders passed by the CCPD under these sections are binding or merely recommendatory.
  • Whether the CCPD can issue interim directions while adjudicating a complaint.
Rahul Bajaj, counsel for the appellant, argued that under Section 76(1) of the 2016 Act, recommendations by the CCPD are statutory mandates, and the authority must take necessary action and inform the CCPD within three months. He also contended that the 2016 Act grants the CCPD sufficient adjudicatory powers, including the ability to issue interim orders, a power that was not present in the earlier 1995 Act.

Conversely, the counsel for the National Power Training Institute argued that the CCPD's orders are merely recommendatory. They cited the proviso to Section 76 of the 2016 Act, which allows an authority to not accept a recommendation if it conveys reasons for such non-acceptance to the CCPD and the aggrieved person. They further asserted that the 2016 Act does not empower the CCPD to interfere with internal management matters, such as employee transfers, which are essential administrative functions based on operational requirements and employee suitability.

The High Court, after comparing the 1995 and 2016 Acts, acknowledged that the 2016 Act provides "better armory" to the CCPD to ensure its recommendations are implemented. Unlike the previous regime where recommendations were not binding, Section 76 of the 2016 Act mandates action, unless valid reasons for non-acceptance are provided to both the CCPD and the aggrieved person.

The Court concluded that recommendations by the CCPD for corrective steps are generally binding, with the exception of situations where the authority has "valid reasons" for non-acceptance, which must be conveyed. While there's no exhaustive list of such reasons, the Court illustrated that a transfer based on administrative exigencies, organizational need, and employee skills could constitute a valid reason for non-acceptance of a recommendation.

Regarding interim orders, the Court held that the CCPD is empowered to make interim recommendations, and their implementation is similarly governed by Section 76, allowing for non-acceptance with valid reasons.
Crucially, the Court clarified the CCPD's involvement in service-related matters. It stated that while service matters are generally the employer's preserve, the CCPD's intervention is permissible and justified if rights available to PwDs under the 2016 Act or other measures related to service are infringed or violated. For instance, if a recruitment process fails to reserve posts for PwDs as mandated, the CCPD can intervene. Similarly, if an employer's policy regarding non-discrimination or preferential treatment for PwDs is violated during a transfer, the CCPD can act under Section 75(1)(b). However, if a transfer is purely for administrative exigencies and doesn't infringe on any specific right of a PwD employee, the 2016 Act's provisions would not be attracted.

Ultimately, the High Court modified the Single Judge's order, directing that the CCPD's order dated August 2, 2024, be treated as an "interim recommendation" under Sections 75 and 76 of the 2016 Act. The National Power Training Institute is now required to make an appropriate decision on this interim recommendation in accordance with Section 76 of the 2016 Act, conveying valid reasons to the CCPD if it cannot accept it. The appeal was disposed of in these terms.


Indian Penal Code, 1860  

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908  

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