The recent judicial review between Vishwanath Sakharam Churi & Others v/s Vijay Sakharam Churi & Another, surrounding the revisionary jurisdiction of the Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, brings to light important considerations regarding the maintainability of applications challenging orders from lower courts. This discussion focuses on the implications of a case involving the rejection of an application for the dismissal of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 (d) and the consequential remedies available to the parties involved.

The matter arose from an order issued by the Small Causes Court in Mumbai on August 21, 2024, which rejected the applicants' request to dismiss the plaint. The applicants sought to invoke the Court’s revisionary jurisdiction, asserting that the order adversely impacted their rights.

Mr. Sayed, representing the respondent, raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the application. He cited the case of Jasraj Lalaji Oswal Vs. Raziya Mehboob Patel (2020), arguing that the applicants had an alternative remedy available under Section 34(4) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. This argument rests on the principle that if an alternative, equally effective remedy exists, a revision under Section 115 may not be maintainable.

In response, Mr. Karande, counsel for the applicants, sought to distinguish Jasraj Lalaji Oswal by highlighting the specifics of their situation. He contended that allowing their application for rejection of the plaint would not affect the substantive rights of the plaintiff in the same way as in the cited case. He referenced a Division Bench decision, Vishankumari Udaysingh Varma, asserting that a suit challenging a compromise decree is not maintainable, thus supporting the idea that the plaintiff would have recourse to apply for recall of the decree rather than suffer an irreparable harm.

The Court's deliberation hinged on the principles established in Bhartiben Shah Vs. Smt. Gracy Thomas (2013), wherein the Full Bench defined the scope of revision under Section 34(4) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act. The key takeaway from this judgment is that not all procedural orders are revisable; only those that significantly impact the substantive rights of the parties are eligible for revision.

The Full Bench outlined that for an order to be deemed revisable, it must directly affect the substantive rights and liabilities of the parties. Examples of such orders include those that dismiss suits, deny amendments to pleadings that assert substantive rights, or lead to abatement of the case. Conversely, orders that merely affect procedural rights—such as granting extensions for filing documents—do not qualify for revision.

In considering the arguments presented, the Court found Mr. Karande’s claims unpersuasive. The distinction he drew regarding the effects of the order on substantive rights did not align with the principles set forth in Jasraj Lalaji Oswal. The Court concluded that any decision to reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 would indeed result in a dismissal of the suit, thus affecting the substantive rights of the parties involved.

Ultimately, the Court dismissed the revision application, affirming that the proper course for the applicants would be to pursue a revision before the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court under Section 34(4) of the MRC Act. This ruling underscores the necessity of adhering to established procedural remedies and highlights the challenges faced by litigants in navigating complex jurisdictional frameworks.

This case reinforces the importance of understanding the boundaries of revisionary jurisdiction and the necessity of alternative remedies. Legal practitioners must remain vigilant in evaluating the appropriate courses of action available to their clients to avoid unnecessary procedural pitfalls. The ruling serves as a precedent for future cases involving similar jurisdictional questions and the interpretation of substantive versus procedural rights under civil law.