High Court's Revival of Decades-Old Property Dispute Judged Unsustainable by Supreme Court.


22 April 2025 Civil Appeals >> Civil & Consumer Law   |   Property Law >> Personal Law   |   Sale Deed >> Personal Law  

The Supreme Court of India has overturned a judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad on May 1, 2024, which had allowed a writ petition filed by the respondents in a long-standing civil suit concerning the cancellation of a sale deed. The apex court, in its recent ruling, criticized the High Court's approach and reasoning, ultimately upholding the order of the appellate court and dismissing the respondents' writ petition.

The case of Kanchhu v/s Prakash Chand & Others., originated from a civil suit [Suit No. 105/1987] instituted in 1987 by the appellant in the court of the Munsif, Khurja, Uttar Pradesh, seeking the cancellation of a registered sale deed dated September 5, 1984. The appellant alleged fraud in the transfer of land measuring over 6 bighas 5 biswas to the respondents, who claimed to be the appellant's brothers.


 

 

After the respondents filed their written statement in September 1987, the trial court framed issues in January 1988. Despite initial participation, the respondents repeatedly sought adjournments and subsequently abstained from the proceedings. Consequently, the trial court passed an ex parte order against the respondents on April 24, 1991. The appellant's evidence was recorded in July 1991, and with no cross-examination, the suit was decreed ex parte in the appellant's favor on August 17, 1991.

The respondents then filed an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) seeking to set aside the ex parte decree, along with an application for condonation of delay. The application for condonation of delay was initially rejected in 1997, but this decision was overturned in revision, and the trial court was directed to consider the application under Order IX Rule 13 on its merits.

However, the trial court again dismissed the application in July 2002, a decision upheld by the District Judge, Gautam Budh Nagar, in October 2002. The appellate court reasoned that the respondent's claim of illness during the period when the judgment was delivered did not constitute sufficient cause for their non-appearance in the preceding proceedings.

This appellate order was challenged by the respondents in a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court. Initially, the writ petition was dismissed as infructuous in December 2011, with a window of two months granted for seeking recall if any substantive issue remained. The respondents, however, filed for recall more than six and a half years later, citing lack of communication from their counsel regarding the dismissal.

The High Court, in its impugned order dated May 1, 2024, condoned the delay, recalled its earlier dismissal, allowed an amendment application, and ultimately allowed the writ petition, setting aside both the appellate order and the original ex parte decree.

The Supreme Court, hearing the appeal against this High Court order, framed the central issue as whether the High Court was justified in allowing the writ petition in the manner it did.

The apex court, while acknowledging the High Court's initial leniency in condoning the significant delay in filing the recall application based on the lawyer's alleged lapse, expressed strong reservations about the subsequent reasoning for allowing the writ petition.

The Supreme Court noted that the High Court Judge did not analyze the respondents' case for recall of the ex parte decree or the appellant's objections. Furthermore, the reasons provided by the appellate court for upholding the dismissal of the Order IX Rule 13 application were seemingly overlooked. The Supreme Court found it "strange" that the High Court directed the framing of issues despite them having been framed much earlier in 1988.

Crucially, the Supreme Court observed that the High Court appeared to have acted as an appellate authority over the ex parte decree, a jurisdiction it does not possess under Article 227 of the Constitution. The High Court's observation that the trial court should have considered the written statement even while proceeding ex parte demonstrated a "clear misconception of the legal position," according to the Supreme Court.

The apex court clarified that once a defendant is set ex parte, their right to produce evidence is curtailed, generally limited to cross-examining the plaintiff's witnesses to challenge the veracity of their claims. While legal issues raised in the written statement can be considered, the court found no basis in law or precedent for the High Court's reasoning that the ex parte decree was flawed for not considering the defense in the written statement.

The Supreme Court emphasized the lack of vigilance and diligence on the part of the respondents throughout the protracted proceedings. The respondents had failed to defend the suit even before being set ex parte in April 1991, and the explanation for their subsequent absence was deemed a "lame excuse." The court highlighted that the respondents did not even present themselves or their claimed attending doctor as witnesses to substantiate their reasons for non-appearance.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that the High Court had erred in not considering whether the respondents had shown sufficient cause for their prolonged absence from the suit proceedings. The apex court found the High Court's approach "flawed" and its observations "irrelevant, illogical, and immaterial," rendering the impugned order "clearly indefensible."

Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and upheld the appellate court's order dated October 8, 2002, thereby dismissing the respondents' writ petition. The decades-old dispute, which had seen an ex parte decree in 1991, was effectively brought back to its earlier conclusion by the Supreme Court's intervention.

  

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908