Judicial Accountability: The Constitutional Challenge to the 'In-House Procedure' for Judge Misconduct.
07-August-2025
Civil Writ Petition >> Civil & Consumer Law
The case originated from a fire at the petitioner's official residence in Delhi, where he was serving as a judge. During the fire-fighting operation, burnt currency notes were discovered in a storeroom. This discovery raised suspicions that the judge had not adhered to the "Restatement of Values of Judicial Life" and led to an inquiry by a three-member committee constituted by the Chief Justice of India (CJI). The petitioner, who was away at the time of the fire, denied that the cash belonged to him, suggesting it was planted to frame him. The committee, however, found "sufficient substance in the allegations" and concluded that the misconduct was serious enough to warrant initiating proceedings for his removal. The CJI then gave the petitioner the option to resign or retire voluntarily, failing which action for removal would be initiated. A subsequent press release announced that the CJI had forwarded the committee's report to the President and Prime Minister for initiating removal action.

The petitioner's senior counsel, Mr. Kapil Sibal, argued that the in-house procedure, specifically paragraphs 5(b) and 7(ii) of the 1999 document, are "ultra vires the Constitution" because they empower the committee and the CJI to determine if a misconduct is serious enough to warrant removal and to initiate proceedings for the same. According to the arguments, Articles 124 and 218 of the Constitution, along with the Judges (Inquiry) Act of 1968, provide the only comprehensive framework for the removal of a judge. Mr. Sibal contended that the in-house procedure attempts to kick-start this parliamentary process, which is the sole prerogative of the Parliament, and thus infringes upon the constitutional scheme. He further argued that the procedure lacks the procedural safeguards of a formal inquiry under the Inquiry Act, such as framing of charges and cross-examination of witnesses, which makes it arbitrary and a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.
The court's analysis, however, appears to uphold the legality and necessity of the in-house procedure. The document notes that the Constitution is silent on disciplinary measures for judges short of removal by impeachment. The in-house procedure was created to fill this "yawning gap between proved misbehaviour and bad conduct inconsistent with the high office". It functions as a non-statutory, internal mechanism to address complaints of misconduct and maintain the integrity of the judiciary through self-regulation. The court's text emphasizes that the inquiry under this procedure is a "fact-finding inquiry" akin to a preliminary investigation, not a guilt-finding one. The report from this committee, while significant, is not a final verdict and does not preclude the judge from having a full-fledged inquiry with all constitutional safeguards if the matter proceeds to Parliament. The court ultimately states that the procedure is not unconstitutional and does not violate any fundamental rights, and a law passed by the Parliament, the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985, also saves the Supreme Court's authority to take such action as it sees fit. The decision also rejected the reliance on a previous case, Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India, as it predated the establishment of the in-house procedure and did not address the validity of such a mechanism.