15 May 2025 Food Adulteration >> Consumer Rights  

In a significant ruling by the Supreme Court of India on May 15, 2025, two distinct criminal appeals, Nagarajan & Another v/s State Of Tamil Nadu & Others (Criminal Appeal No. 1390 of 2025) and Naresh Chandra v/s State of Uttar Pradesh & Another (Criminal Appeal No. 2054 of 2025), were heard concurrently due to a common legal question concerning the applicability of probation and mollified sentences in food adulteration cases. The judgments under appeal originated from the Madras High Court and the Allahabad High Court, respectively.

Factual Overview of the Cases:

The lead appeal involved Nagarajan and Selvaraj, who were prosecuted after a curd sample from their shop on June 26, 2001, failed to meet the standards prescribed by the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (PoFA Act). They were convicted by the Trial Court on June 18, 2006, under Sections 7(1) and 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 2(ia)(a)(m) of the PoFA Act, receiving a sentence of six months' simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 3,000 each. Their conviction and sentence were upheld by the Appellate Court and subsequently by the Madras High Court.

In the connected appeal, Naresh Chandra was accused of preventing a Food Inspector from taking a sample of spices and other food items he was selling on March 20, 1985. Following a trial, he was convicted on August 25, 1987, under Section 7/10(1) read with Section 16(1)(c)(d) of the PoFA Act, and sentenced to six months' simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000. This conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Appellate Court and the Allahabad High Court.

Contentions of the Parties:

Counsel for both sets of appellants sought a mollification of sentence, primarily arguing for the application of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (Probation Act). Their core arguments were:

• Section 20AA of the PoFA Act, which denies probation benefits for first-time offenders, violates Article 14 (Equality before Law) and Article 21 (Protection of Life and Personal Liberty) of the Constitution of India.
• Section 20AA contradicts the reformative justice approach enshrined in Section 360 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Cr.PC).
• The Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (FSS Act), which repealed the PoFA Act, lacks a provision equivalent to Section 20AA, indicating a legislative shift towards a reformatory framework.

Conversely, the State of Tamil Nadu, represented by its counsel, strongly emphasized Section 20AA of the PoFA Act, arguing for a complete exclusion of the Probation Act and Section 360 Cr.PC. The State contended that food adulteration is a serious crime against public health, and the legislative intent behind incorporating Section 20AA in 1976 was to ensure perpetrators face strict consequences, addressing growing concerns about food adulteration. The State of Uttar Pradesh did not present arguments.

Legislative and Constitutional Framework:

The Court examined several key legislative provisions:

• Section 20AA of the PoFA Act (introduced in 1976): This section explicitly stated that the Probation Act and Section 360 Cr.PC would not apply to persons convicted under the PoFA Act, unless they were under eighteen years of age.
• Section 97 of the FSS Act: This act repealed the PoFA Act. However, its 'repeal and savings' proviso ensures that previous operations, acquired rights/liabilities, and penalties incurred under the repealed act are not affected.
• Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India: Appellants invoked this article, which protects against conviction for an offense except for violation of a law in force at the time of the act, and against a penalty greater than that applicable at the time of the offense.
• Article 15(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966: This article, ratified by India, similarly states that no heavier penalty shall be imposed than what was applicable at the time of the offense, and that an offender shall benefit if a lighter penalty is introduced by law subsequently.
• Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897: This section outlines that the repeal of an enactment generally does not affect previous operations, acquired rights, liabilities, penalties incurred, or ongoing investigations/remedies, unless a different intention appears.
• Section 16 of the PoFA Act: This section specifies penalties, including imprisonment for a term of not less than six months but up to three years, and a fine of not less than one thousand rupees, for offenses like selling adulterated food or obstructing a food inspector.

Questions Before the Court:

The Supreme Court identified two interconnected legal questions for its decision:

1. Can the benefit of the Probation Act be granted to the appellants?
2. If not, can the reduced sentence envisaged by the FSS Act be imposed on them instead?

Analysis of Precedents:

The Court meticulously reviewed various judicial precedents to guide its decision:

• Ishar Das v. State of Punjab (1973): Prior to the 1976 amendment, the Probation Act was applicable to PoFA offenses. However, the Court cautioned against its casual use, emphasizing that food adulteration is a menace to public health and requires stricter measures.
• Jai Narain v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi (1972) and Pyarali K. Tejani v. Mahadeo Ramchandra Dange (1974): These cases reinforced the view that anti-social conduct and economic offenses like food adulteration do not easily merit the application of probationary processes, given the paramount need for societal protection.
• Prem Ballab v. State (Delhi Admn.) (1977): Decided shortly after the 1976 amendment introduced Section 20AA, this case highlighted the legislative trend against applying probation to social and economic offenses such as food adulteration, even if the amendment itself did not apply retrospectively to the specific case.
• T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe (1983): This significant ruling established the principle of beneficial interpretation for penal statutes, where a later law providing for a lighter punishment should be applied even to pending cases. However, the Court in the current appeal distinguished T. Barai, noting that it involved a conflict between central and state enactments, concerned punishment rather than probation, and lacked a similar repeal and savings provision like Section 97 of the FSS Act.
• Babu Ram v. State of Haryana (1987): This decision unequivocally held that Section 20AA of the PoFA Act, being a special provision, overrides the general provisions of the Probation Act.
• Nemi Chand v. State of Rajasthan (2018) and A.K. Sarkar & Co. v. State of W.B. (2024): More recent cases that, relying on T. Barai, converted sentences of imprisonment to fines for offenses under the PoFA Act, especially noting the FSS Act's provision for monetary penalties without imprisonment for certain offenses.
• Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab (1964): This case affirmed that an ex post facto law that mollifies the rigour of criminal law is valid and should be applied retrospectively under the rule of beneficial construction, particularly when it aims at the reformation of an offender without altering the offense's ingredients or sentence limits.
• Basheer v. State of Kerala (2004): This case clarified that the rule of beneficial construction for penal statutes is limited to the reduction of sentences and does not apply if an amendment creates new offenses or if cases are pending in appeal and applying the amendment would vitiate trials.

Judgment:

For the aforementioned reasons, both appeals were partly allowed. The sentences of imprisonment for six months imposed on Nagarajan and Selvaraj were converted to a fine of Rs. 30,000 each. In the case of Naresh Chandra, the sentence of imprisonment was converted to a fine of Rs. 20,000. All three appellants have until the end of June 2025 to pay their respective fines, failing which the order shall stand.

Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954