23 May 2025 Civil Appeals >> Civil & Consumer Law  

After decades of legal skirmishes, the Supreme Court of India has finally brought a protracted property dispute to a close, ordering the immediate handover of vacant and peaceful possession of a suit property to the original plaintiff. The ruling, delivered on May 23, 2025, by the Honourable Mr. Justice J.B. Pardiwala and the Honourable Mr. Justice R. Mahadevan, dismissed an appeal seeking the deletion of a grandson's name from the array of parties, reaffirming lower court decisions and condemning what it deemed to be tactics aimed at delaying justice.

The case, Sulthan Said Ibrahim v/s Prakasan & Others, originated from a 1996 suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell a 1-cent property in Palakkad Town, Kerala, which includes a tiled-roofed shop. The original defendant, Jameela Beevi, had agreed to sell the property to the original plaintiff for Rs. 6,00,000. The appellant, Jameela Beevi's grandson, was even a witness to this sale agreement.

A Winding Path to Justice:

The journey of this case highlights significant delays and procedural complexities, which the Supreme Court critically examined. Despite obtaining an ex-parte decree in 1998 and a final decree in 2003, the original plaintiff had yet to gain possession of the property.

Key Stages of the Litigation:

• Phase I (1996-1999): The original plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance, which was decreed ex parte in 1998. The original defendant's attempt to set aside this decree was initially dismissed but later allowed by the High Court, restoring the suit for trial.
• Phase II (2003): Upon restoration, the original defendant contested the agreement, claiming it was forged from signed papers obtained for a loan. However, the Trial Court decreed the suit in 2003, finding the agreement proven and the defense incredible.
• Phase III (2003-2008): The original defendant challenged the decree, but both the High Court and the Supreme Court ultimately dismissed her appeals, conclusively affirming the decree for specific performance by August 2008.
• Phase IV (2008-2012): Following the decree's finality, the original plaintiff initiated execution proceedings. The original defendant passed away in 2008, leading to the impleadment of her legal heirs, including the appellant. Initially, the appellant raised no objection to his impleadment. Objections were raised by other legal heirs regarding possession and timely deposit of consideration, which were dismissed by the Principal Sub Court in 2012. The court held the deposit valid and confirmed that possession was "implicit in the decree for specific performance".
• Phase V (2012): An appeal against the dismissal of the rescission application was also dismissed by the High Court.
• Phase VI (2012-2025): The appellant then filed an application in July 2012 to delete his name from the parties, claiming he was wrongly impleaded as a legal heir under Mohammedan Law and asserting tenancy rights inherited from his father. He contended his tenancy rights couldn't be adjudicated in execution proceedings.

Supreme Court's Scrutiny of Appellant's Claims:

The Trial Court dismissed the appellant's application in 2013, noting his long-standing participation in litigation without objection and viewing his new plea as a delaying tactic. The High Court upheld this in 2021, stating that the appellant's impleadment had become final and his subsequent application was barred by res judicata.

The Supreme Court concurred with the lower courts' findings, dismissing the appellant's contentions.

Key findings by the Supreme Court:

• Impleadment and Res Judicata: The court emphasized that the appellant had ample opportunity to object to his impleadment as a legal heir under Order XXII Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) but failed to do so. His participation in subsequent proceedings, including an application to rescind the contract, without raising this objection, solidified his position as a party. The court held that the issue of his impleadment had attained finality and his later application for deletion was indeed barred by

res judicata.

• Claim of Tenancy: The appellant's assertion of inherited tenancy rights was rejected. The court noted the absence of any clause acknowledging his tenancy in the 1996 sale agreement, unlike the 1976 assignment deed through which Jameela Beevi acquired the property. Furthermore, the court found no documentary evidence to support his tenancy claim, and his municipality license from 2011 was issued long after the suit was decreed. The court concluded this was "another weapon from the arsenal of dubious tactics" to protract proceedings.
• Possession Implicit in Decree: Addressing the argument that the decree for specific performance did not explicitly grant possession, the Supreme Court reiterated its established position that "the relief of transfer of possession is implicit in the decree for specific performance" when the contracting party has exclusive possession of the suit property. This meant the original plaintiff was entitled to possession even without it being specifically mentioned in the decree.

The Supreme Court observed that the appellant's actions demonstrated a "cunning strategy to delay the execution of a sale deed". The court also noted that the sale deed had already been executed during the pendency of the appeal.

Final Verdict:

In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal with costs of Rs. 25,000 to be paid by the appellant to the Legal Services Authority within two weeks. Crucially, the court directed the Executing Court to ensure "vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property is handed over to the respondent no.1" within two months, authorizing police aid if necessary. This decisive order aims to finally enforce a decree that has remained unexecuted for over two decades.