The petitioner in this case sought extraordinary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging the rejection of their representation concerning the allotment of a plot in Rohini, New Delhi. This analysis examines the petitioner's claims, the responses from the authorities, and the court's final ruling.

The petitioner initially applied for a flat under the Middle Income Group (MIG) category in the Housing New Registration Scheme of 1976, depositing ?7,500 and receiving a registration certificate. Following a prolonged wait for allotment, the petitioner transferred their application to the Rohini Residential Scheme in 1981. After years of inaction and approaching retirement in 2005, the petitioner withdrew a prior request for cancellation and requested consideration for allotment based on their original registration.

In June 2012, a draw of lots declared the petitioner eligible for a specific plot. However, the requisite demand-cum-allotment letter was never issued, prompting the petitioner to pursue legal recourse. Following a legal notice and subsequent petitions, the court directed the authorities to consider the representation. Despite this, the respondent's subsequent rejection cited a historical cancellation request as grounds for denial.

The crux of the case rested on two significant legal principles: delay and laches and the validity of registration. The respondents argued that the petitioner had voluntarily cancelled their registration in 1991, thus forfeiting any rights to allotment. In contrast, the petitioner contended that the lack of a processed cancellation request and the failure to communicate this effectively undermined the rejection of their claim.

Respondent's Position

The respondents maintained that the petitioner had not only requested cancellation but had also failed to act on the subsequent communication regarding the refund of their registration amount. They emphasized that the cancellation was legally valid and thus negated any entitlement to a plot. Additionally, they highlighted the principle of delay, asserting that the petitioner's long inaction should bar the claim.

The petitioner countered by asserting that the cancellation was not effectively communicated and that the lack of a refund kept their registration active. They argued that the failure to issue a demand-cum-allotment letter despite being selected in the draw of lots constituted a legal wrong. Furthermore, the petitioner cited precedents where courts had restored rights to applicants under similar circumstances.

Upon reviewing the arguments, the court identified that the petitioner could not claim any vested right to the plot based solely on the draw of lots. The court ruled that the voluntary cancellation of registration effectively nullified the petitioner’s eligibility for allotment. The court also noted that the petitioner had neglected to follow up on their legal rights for an extended period, further complicating their claim.

The court acknowledged the respondent's procedural shortcomings but determined that the principle of delay and laches played a pivotal role in dismissing the case. It highlighted the necessity for individuals to act promptly on their legal rights and the potential consequences of inaction.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the writ petition, underscoring the importance of timely act ion in legal claims. However, it directed the respondents to refund the registration amount with interest, recognizing the petitioner’s original financial contribution. This case serves as a reminder of the complexities surrounding administrative processes and the critical nature of prompt legal action in upholding rights. The decision reiterates the balance courts must maintain between protecting individual rights and ensuring that procedural integrity and timeliness are respected in the administrative realm.