Navigating Electoral Disputes: The Scope of Judicial Review Before Elections.


06 November 2024 Elections Law >> Constitution & Law Procedure  

The rejection of a candidate's nomination for elections is a significant event in the electoral process, especially when it is perceived as arbitrary or unjust. In the case of Aashish Kishor Gadkari v/s The Election Commission of India & Another, the Bombay High Court was asked to consider whether a writ petition could be entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution to challenge the rejection of a nomination for the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly elections in the 173 Chembur Constituency. This case serves as a crucial example of the intersection between judicial review and the electoral process, particularly the scope of writ jurisdiction concerning pre-election disputes.

Factual Background: 

The petitioner in this case sought to contest the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly elections scheduled for November 20, 2024, in the Chembur constituency. On October 30, 2024, during the scrutiny of nominations, the Returning Officer rejected the petitioner’s nomination on two grounds: the failure to administer the statutory oath and the absence of the proposer’s signature on the nomination form. The petitioner argued that these were technical defects, and as such, he should have been given an opportunity to rectify them before the deadline.

 
 

The petitioner contended that he was under the bona fide belief that mentioning the proposer’s name sufficed, and that the signature was not a mandatory requirement. Additionally, the petitioner argued that he had been denied the opportunity to rectify the objections raised by the Returning Officer before the stipulated deadline of 11:00 a.m. on October 30, 2024. The petitioner appealed for judicial intervention to ensure that his nomination be accepted and his name included on the ballot, asserting that the rejection was arbitrary and unjust.

Preliminary Objection:

At the outset, the respondents raised a significant preliminary objection, claiming that the writ petition challenging the rejection of a nomination was not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution. The respondents referred to the landmark case of N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer (1952), where the Supreme Court had held that election-related matters could only be challenged after the election through an election petition, not through a writ petition before the election. Further, the respondents cited the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Karmaveer Tulshiram Autade v. State Election Commission (2021), which had upheld the constitutional bar on judicial interference in pre-election matters, specifically under Article 243-O for Panchayat elections.

However, the petitioner’s counsel, Mr. Arshad Shaikh, argued that the court's intervention was warranted due to the arbitrary actions of the Returning Officer. He cited the case of Suleman Fakruddin Ansari v. S.B. Kulkarni (1963), in which the Bombay High Court had allowed intervention in pre-election disputes. The petitioner’s counsel contended that the legal landscape had evolved since the Ponnuswami case, and that judicial review was available in cases of clear arbitrariness or injustice in the electoral process.

Analysis of Legal Precedents: 

The core legal issue in this case revolves around whether judicial review is available to challenge the rejection of a nomination before the election process is concluded. The Full Bench decision in Karmaveer Tulshiram Autade (2021) had unequivocally stated that, in the context of Panchayat elections, writ petitions challenging the rejection of nominations were barred by Article 243-O of the Constitution. This provision, along with similar provisions under Article 329 of the Constitution concerning Legislative Assembly elections, restricts judicial interference during the electoral process.

In response to the petitioner's reliance on Suleman Fakruddin Ansari (1963), the court noted that this judgment had allowed for judicial review in pre-election matters, particularly where there was clear administrative error. However, this judgment pre-dated the constitutional amendments that now explicitly bar judicial intervention in election matters.

The Supreme Court's decision in State of Goa v. Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh (2021) provided further clarity, particularly concerning municipal and Panchayat elections, where the Court emphasized that the writ court must generally adopt a "hands-off" approach once the election process is underway, but may intervene in limited circumstances where such intervention would facilitate the electoral process.

Application to the Facts: 

Applying the legal principles to the facts of the case, the court found that the petitioner’s nomination was rejected due to the failure to meet the strict procedural requirements, including the administration of the oath and the signing of the nomination form by the proposer. These were not merely technical defects but critical lapses that affected the validity of the nomination.

The court noted that the petitioner had ample notice of the deadlines for submitting corrected documents, including the requirement for the proposer’s signature and the oath. Moreover, the election schedule was public, and the scrutiny of nominations was scheduled for a specific time. The petitioner’s failure to meet these deadlines could not be excused, even under a liberal interpretation of the rules.
The court observed that allowing the petitioner to rectify the defects after the deadline would disrupt the electoral process and affect other candidates who had complied with the deadlines. The principles established in Fouziya were thus invoked to support the view that judicial intervention in this case would not serve the purpose of facilitating the election process.

Conclusion: 

In conclusion, the court held that it was not within its jurisdiction to intervene in the rejection of the petitioner’s nomination at this stage. The legal bar against judicial interference during the electoral process, as established in the Full Bench decision and reinforced by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Fouziya, applied to the present case. The court emphasized that intervention was only permissible in exceptional circumstances where it would aid the electoral process, which was not the case here. Thus, the writ petition was dismissed, and the rule was discharged. The court made it clear that the petitioner was not precluded from pursuing other legal remedies after the election through an election petition, where all substantive issues, including the merits of the rejection, could be addressed. This case serves as a reminder of the delicate balance courts must maintain when exercising jurisdiction over election-related disputes and the limitations imposed by constitutional provisions designed to ensure the smooth conduct of elections.

  Constitution of India, 1950