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A recent Supreme Court of India judgment, delivered on May 21, 2025, delves into a critical constitutional question: whether the Air Force School, Bamrauli, falls within the definition of "State or Authority" under Article 12 of the Indian Constitution, thereby making it amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. This ruling, stemming from Civil Appeal Nos. 10899 and 11378 of 2013, has significant implications for the status of educational institutions with ties to government entities.

Background of the Appeals The case consolidated two appeals:

• Dileep Kumar Pandey v. Union of India & Others (Civil Appeal No. 10899 of 2013): The appellant, a trained graduate teacher in physical education, was appointed in 2005 on probation. His services were later deemed surplus, and he was offered a contractual position or termination. He sought a declaration from the High Court that the school was a 'State' under Article 12. A Single Judge initially agreed, but the Division Bench overturned this, stating the school was not a 'State' and thus not subject to writ petition under Article 226.
• Sanjay Kumar Sharma (Civil Appeal No. 11378 of 2013): Appointed as a post-graduate teacher in 1993 and later confirmed, the appellant also served as officiating Principal. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him, leading to his termination. His writ petitions challenging his termination and the appointment of another principal were dismissed by the Single Judge, a decision upheld by the Division Bench on the grounds of non-maintainability of the writ petition.

Arguments Presented by the Appellants :

The appellants' counsel argued that Air Force Schools promote education, fine arts, and culture, primarily for IAF personnel and their families. They asserted that the Air Force Headquarters exercises significant control over these schools, evidenced by:

• Claims in affiliation applications to CBSE that the school was fully financed by the IAF.
• Construction of school buildings using public funds under the authorization of the Ministry of Defence.
• Fixation of staff pay scales by the Air Force Headquarters, which also dictates conformity to these scales for the Command Schools Management Committee.
• Administration under the Education Code of Air Force Schools, 2005, which is identical to the Kendriya Vidyalaya Education Code.
• Functional and administrative control of the IAF over the Indian Air Force Educational and Cultural Society (IAFE&CS) and the schools, suggesting they are "authority" under Article 12, thus amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226.
• The argument was made that even if the school is a private body, its public function of imparting education, coupled with substantial financial and administrative control from the IAF, brings it under the purview of "State" for writ jurisdiction.

Arguments by the Additional Solicitor General (ASG):

The ASG countered that the Air Force Schools are governed by "Non-Public Funds" or "Regimental Funds," with income derived from tuition, interest, and various fees. It was contended that no Central Government funds are involved in the welfare fund or school finances, and the Central Government or Ministry of Defence exerts no control over the school's daily operations or management. The ASG also referred to previous Supreme Court decisions, arguing that the issue was covered against the appellants, especially citing cases like Army Welfare Education Society, New Delhi v. Sunil Kumar Sharma & Ors. and St. Mary's Education Society & Anr. v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava & Ors.. These cases emphasized that even if an educational institution performs a public duty, the employment relationship with its staff, if not governed by statutory provisions, remains a private contractual matter without a public law element.

Court's Consideration and Decision:

The Supreme Court, in its primary opinion, upheld the Division Bench's view that the Air Force School was not a 'State' under Article 12. The Court found no material to definitively show that the school was established using government funds or that it was governed by statutory regulations. While the school applied for CBSE affiliation stating it was fully financed by the IAF, there was no concrete evidence to support this claim. The Education Code, though applicable, was deemed not to have statutory force, and audited accounts showed no receipt of public funds or grants. The Court concluded that the IAF's determination of pay scales for its schools does not equate to pervasive control over their functioning. The relationship between the appellants and the school was considered a private contractual matter, and any breach would not involve a public law element amenable to writ jurisdiction.

Dissenting Opinion Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah offered a dissenting opinion, arguing that the school should be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. He highlighted that the school was established by the IAF as a welfare measure for its personnel's children, with the IAF providing infrastructure and a mechanism for administrative and financial operations. He noted that the school building is on IAF land and was constructed entirely with IAF funds. Justice Amanullah emphasized that imparting education is a public function, and the administrative control by a School Managing Committee composed of IAF officers indicates pervasive control by the IAF over recruitment, disciplinary actions, and termination of staff. He pointed out that official orders related to appointments and pay were issued under the authority of IAF officers, further demonstrating deep and pervasive governmental control. The dissenting opinion concluded that the funding, originating substantially from the public exchequer, and the pervasive control by the IAF, clearly demonstrate the school's character as a "State" under Article 12, thus justifying writ jurisdiction.

Conclusion :

The Supreme Court's judgment reaffirms that for an entity to be considered a 'State' under Article 12 and therefore subject to writ jurisdiction under Article 226, there must be demonstrable pervasive governmental control and substantial public funding, beyond mere regulatory oversight or private contractual arrangements. While the majority found these conditions unmet for the Air Force School, the dissenting opinion underscores the complexities in defining "State" in cases involving institutions with significant, albeit indirect, government ties.