In a recent case of Jilajeet Satyanarayan Pandey & Others v/s Chandrabali Rajnarayan Shukla (since deceased) & Others., before the Bombay High Court, the Applicants invoked the Court’s revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to challenge a judgment and decree that upheld the eviction of tenants from a property based on the bonafide requirement of the Plaintiff. The matter involved the interpretation of the landlord's need for the property in question, and whether the bonafide requirement, as initially pleaded, was substantiated throughout the proceedings. This case highlights important legal principles in landlord-tenant disputes, particularly in the context of bonafide requirements and partial eviction.

The dispute centers around a property in Mumbai, specifically Stable No. 93, which had been leased to the original Defendant in 1970. The Plaintiff, claiming ownership of the property, filed a suit in 2003 seeking eviction on several grounds, including default in rent payment, nuisance, unlawful subletting, and most notably, bonafide requirement for the use of the property for dairy farming. The tenancy agreement was amended over the years, and after a period of legal wrangling, the case reached the Small Causes Court, Mumbai.

Dr. Chandrachud, representing the Revision Applicants (the tenants), argued that the bonafide requirement pleaded by the Plaintiff was no longer valid. He highlighted several inconsistencies in the Plaintiff's testimony, including admissions made during cross-examination, where the Plaintiff admitted that neither he nor his sons were conducting the dairy business or hawking milk door-to-door, as stated in the original plaint. According to Dr. Chandrachud, these admissions disproved the Plaintiff's claim of bonafide requirement.

Furthermore, Dr. Chandrachud pointed out a settlement filed by the Plaintiff’s son, Daroga Chandrabali Shukla, indicating that the need for the property by the Plaintiff’s family, particularly Daroga, had been resolved. Additionally, he referenced another decree obtained by the Plaintiff for a different property (R.A.E. Suit No. 331/749 of 2003), arguing that the Plaintiff could not claim a bonafide need for the current property when he had obtained a similar decree elsewhere.

On the other hand, Mr. Singh, appearing for the Plaintiff, argued that the admission made by the Plaintiff during his cross-examination was a result of his advanced age (he was 90 years old at the time of deposition), and therefore, should not be given undue weight. He stressed that the Plaintiff and his sons were indeed engaged in dairy farming and milk selling, and the bonafide need for the suit property had been sufficiently established. Mr. Singh also clarified that the Plaintiff had not been able to execute the decree in the other property case, and thus, the issue of alternate accommodation did not arise.

The Court observed that the main issue before it was whether the trial and appellate courts had erred in accepting the Plaintiff's bonafide requirement for the suit premises. It was undisputed that the Plaintiff and his sons were engaged in the dairy business, and the property in question was required to house buffaloes for their dairy farming activities. The Court took note of the Plaintiff's deposition, particularly the admission regarding the hawking of milk door-to-door. However, the Court concluded that this admission did not negate the Plaintiff’s bonafide need for space to house buffaloes, which was the primary requirement expressed in the plaint.

The Court also considered the advanced age of the Plaintiff at the time of his deposition and noted that his inconsistent statements during cross-examination could not be the sole basis for rejecting his bonafide need. Moreover, despite the filing of a settlement application by Daroga Chandrabali Shukla (the Plaintiff's elder son), the Court found no substantial evidence that would indicate a lack of need for the property, especially when the need for the suit premises was based on both sons' involvement in the dairy business.

However, the Court acknowledged a significant change in the situation. It observed that Daroga, one of the sons, no longer appeared interested in the eviction of the Defendants, leading the Court to consider partial eviction of the Defendants from the property, as only one of the two sons (Brijbhushan) remained in need of the premises.

The Court further referred to Section 16(2) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, which allows for partial eviction if the Court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused to either party. In this case, the Court found that partial eviction was appropriate, especially given the unique circumstances of the case, including the non-participation of one of the sons in the eviction process.

The Court ultimately modified the eviction decree, directing the Defendants to hand over possession of only half of the suit premises to the Plaintiff’s son, Brijbhushan, while allowing the remaining portion to remain with the original tenants. This partial eviction was ordered in the interest of balancing the bonafide requirement of the Plaintiff with the rights of the tenants.

This decision reinforces the principle that the bonafide requirement must be continuously substantiated throughout the proceedings, and in cases where the landlord’s need evolves or changes, partial eviction may be a viable remedy. It also highlights the importance of considering the specific facts and circumstances of each case in landlord-tenant disputes.

The Revision Application was therefore partly allowed, with the Defendants required to hand over possession of half the premises by February 2025.