The civil appeals in question stemmed from a partition suit filed in 1956 by the original plaintiff, Padmakshy, seeking separate possession of immovable properties. After the passing of a preliminary decree in 1958 and a final decree in 1970, the dispute revolved around property item No. 4 in the plaint schedule. This property, measuring 1 acre 57 cents, was mortgaged several times, with a series of complex transactions involving multiple parties, including the legal representatives of the original plaintiff and the defendants.

Despite the lengthy litigation process, issues surrounding possession remained unresolved. The plaintiff sought execution of the final decree, which ultimately led to the delivery of possession of a portion of the property to the plaintiff in 1994. However, the property had been transferred to the predecessor of the respondents (Raghuthaman) during the pendency of the suit. Raghuthaman contested the execution by filing applications under Order XXI Rule 99 of the CPC, seeking re-delivery of possession.

One of the main legal issues in this case was whether Raghuthaman, as a pendente lite transferee, had the right to challenge the execution proceedings. The appellants (the legal representatives of Padmakshy) argued that since Raghuthaman had acquired the property during the pendency of the suit, he could not claim an independent right to resist the execution. The appellants further contended that the execution petition was barred by limitation, as the final decree had been passed more than 20 years ago, and Raghuthaman’s claim had no merit.

On the other hand, the respondents argued that the final decree had not been executed within the prescribed time limit, and therefore, their predecessor, Raghuthaman, as a stranger to the decree, had the right to file an application under Order XXI Rule 99 CPC to contest the execution.

The Supreme Court closely examined the provisions under Order XXI Rule 99, which allows a third party, not party to the original suit, to challenge execution if they are dispossessed of immovable property. The Court emphasized that even though Raghuthaman was a pendente lite transferee, the CPC grants him the right to seek redelivery of possession under Order XXI Rule 99 once dispossessed.

This view was corroborated by the Court’s ruling in Yogesh Goyanka v. Govind (2024), where it was established that a pendente lite transferee can protect their interest, as the doctrine of lis pendens does not render such transfers void but subservient to the ongoing litigation. Therefore, Raghuthaman had the right to resist the execution of the decree and seek a re-delivery of possession.

The Court further cited the Chiranji Lal case (2005), where it was held that the limitation period for execution of a partition decree begins from the date the final decree is passed, not from the date it is engrossed on stamp paper. This principle was also applied to the case at hand, as the appellants had filed the execution petition long after the final decree was passed, making the execution time-barred.

Pendente Lite Transfers: The ruling reinforces the legal standing of a pendente lite transferee, stating that such a party has the right to file an application under Order XXI Rule 99 to seek redelivery of property if they are dispossessed in execution proceedings. This provides clarity on the rights of individuals who acquire property during the pendency of a suit but are not parties to the original litigation.

Limitation in Execution of Partition Decrees: The decision in Chiranji Lal emphasized that the limitation period for executing a partition decree commences from the date the final decree is passed, not from the date the decree is engrossed on stamp paper. This underscores the importance of timely filing execution petitions and prevents parties from using technicalities to delay proceedings.

Order XXI Rule 99 CPC: The Court highlighted the applicability of Order XXI Rule 99 to third parties (strangers to the decree) who are dispossessed during the execution of a decree. This provision ensures that individuals with a legitimate interest in the property are not deprived of possession without due process.

The Supreme Court’s ruling in this case underscores the importance of protecting the rights of third parties (including pendente lite transferees) in execution proceedings. By allowing the pendente lite transferee to challenge dispossession, the Court reaffirmed the principles of natural justice and fair play in legal proceedings. Furthermore, the Court’s stance on the starting point for the limitation period for executing partition decrees provides much-needed clarity for practitioners and litigants alike.

In sum, the case reinforces the need for vigilance in execution petitions and highlights the rights of third-party transferees to assert their interests in immovable property during ongoing legal disputes. The ruling is a significant step in ensuring equity in property-related disputes, particularly in complex cases involving multiple transfers and parties.