Supreme Court Condemns Dilatory Tactics in Specific Performance Case, Orders Immediate Possession.


23 May 2025 Civil Appeals >> Civil & Consumer Law  

The Supreme Court of India on May 23, 2025, unequivocally dismissed an appeal of Sulthan Said Ibrahim v/s Prakasan & Others., challenging the High Court of Kerala's decision to reject a plea for deletion from a civil suit, condemning the appellant's "dubious tactics" aimed at prolonging litigation. The Court, comprised of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan, ordered the immediate handing over of vacant and peaceful possession of the disputed property, highlighting the persistent abuse of the legal process.


The case, Sulthan Said Ibrahim v/s Prakasan & Others, Civil Appeal No. 7108 of 2025, stems from a specific performance suit (O.S. No. 617/1996) initiated by the original plaintiff (Respondent No. 1) in 1996. The suit sought to enforce an agreement to sell a tiled-roofed shop and land, executed on June 14, 1996, by the original defendant, Late Jameela Beevi. Notably, the appellant, Jameela Beevi's grandson, was a witness to this sale agreement.

 
 

The journey to justice for the original plaintiff has been arduous, marked by a series of delays. Despite an ex-parte decree in 1998 and a final decree after contested hearing in 2003, the plaintiff has yet to obtain possession of the property.

The appellant's involvement in the protracted legal battle began after the original defendant's death on October 19, 2008, when he, along with other legal heirs, was impleaded in the execution proceedings. Initially, the appellant raised no objection to his impleadment. However, in July 2012, he filed an application under Order I Rule 10(2) of the CPC, seeking to be removed from the list of parties. He claimed he was wrongly impleaded as a legal heir under Mohammedan Law and asserted that he was a tenant in the suit property, having inherited the tenancy from his late father.

Both the Trial Court and the High Court dismissed the appellant's application. The Trial Court noted that the appellant had ample prior opportunities to object to his impleadment but chose not to, and was engaging in "cunning strategy to delay the execution of a sale deed." The High Court affirmed this, stating that the impleadment had become final and the application was barred by res judicata.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellant's counsel argued that the High Court erred in its res judicata finding, especially as the relief of possession was not explicitly granted in the original specific performance decree. He also stressed the appellant's alleged tenancy rights, protected under Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. Furthermore, it was contended that under Mohammedan Law, the legal heirs of a pre-deceased son are not the legal heirs of their grandmother, making his impleadment incorrect.

The respondent's counsel countered, asserting that the appeal was solely a tactic to further delay the execution of the final decree. He reiterated that the appellant had ample opportunity to object to his impleadment earlier and had participated in various proceedings without raising these issues. The claim of tenancy was also challenged, citing lack of documentary evidence and the fact that the 1996 sale agreement, witnessed by the appellant, did not mention any tenancy.

The Supreme Court, in its analysis, upheld the High Court's application of res judicata. The Court emphasized that when a party is impleaded as a legal heir after due inquiry and without objection, that issue attains finality and cannot be re-litigated at a later stage, even under Order I Rule 10 of the CPC. The Court stressed that allowing such repetitive objections would be contrary to "fair play and justice" and would keep parties "in a state of limbo."

Regarding the tenancy claim, the Supreme Court found it to be "one more weapon from the arsenal of dubious tactics employed by the appellant." The Court noted that the appellant, despite being a witness to the 1996 agreement, did not raise any objection regarding tenancy until his 2012 application. Furthermore, the Municipality license in the appellant's name was issued "long after the suit was decreed" and during the pendency of execution proceedings. Both lower courts had concurrently rejected the tenancy claim.

Finally, addressing the argument about possession not being explicitly decreed, the Supreme Court reiterated its established position that the relief of possession is implicit in a decree for specific performance when the exclusive possession of the property is with the contracting party.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court found no error in the decisions of the lower courts and dismissed the appeal with costs of Rs 25,000/- to be paid by the appellant. The Court directed the Executing Court to ensure that vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property is handed over to the respondent within two months, with police aid if necessary.