The Supreme Court of India has disposed of long-pending writ petitions and a contempt petition related to the controversial Salwa Judum movement in Chhattisgarh in the matter of Nandini Sundar & Others v/s State of Chattisgarh, stating that the original prayers in the writ petitions have been addressed and that the enactment of new legislation by the State Assembly cannot be considered an act of contempt.

The decision comes after extensive arguments from both sides, with petitioners asserting that the matters should remain pending due to ongoing concerns regarding rehabilitation, alleged contempt of court by the State of Chhattisgarh, and non-compliance by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). Conversely, the respondents, represented by the ASG, argued that the orders of the Court had been complied with and the cases no longer warranted further consideration.

Background of the Case:

The core of the legal battle stems from a significant Supreme Court order dated July 5, 2011, in the case of Nandini Sunder vs. State of Chhattisgarh. This landmark ruling issued several crucial directives, including:

• Cessation of SPO Use: The immediate halt of the State of Chhattisgarh's use of Special Police Officers (SPOs) in counter-insurgency operations against Maoist/Naxalite activities.
• Funding Prohibition: A directive for the Union of India to cease all funding supporting the recruitment of SPOs for counter-insurgency.
• Firearm Recall: The State of Chhattisgarh was ordered to recall all firearms and related accessories issued to current or former SPOs.
• SPO Protection: Measures to protect the lives of former SPOs from all forces, including Maoists/Naxalites.
• Prevention of Private Armies: The State was mandated to prevent the operation of any group, including Salwa Judum and Koya Commandos, that takes law into private hands or violates human rights, and to investigate past alleged criminal activities of such groups.
• CBI Investigation: The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) was directed to take over investigations into incidents of violence in March 2011 in Dantewada District villages (Morpalli, Tadmetla, and Timmapuram) and alleged violence against Swami Agnivesh.
• Status Reports: The CBI was to submit a preliminary status report within six weeks, and the State of Chhattisgarh and Union of India were to submit compliance reports within the same timeframe.

The petitioners, represented by senior counsel Ms. Nitya Ramakrishnan, contended that despite these directions, the original writ petitions from 2007 remained pending to ensure all prayers were ultimately granted. They highlighted the enactment of the Chhattisgarh Auxiliary Armed Police Force Act, 2011, by the State as a contemptuous act, arguing it circumvented the spirit of the Supreme Court's earlier order. They also raised concerns about the rehabilitation of former SPOs and the NHRC's alleged non-compliance in filing an affidavit.

Court's Rationale for Disposal:

The Supreme Court, after considering all submissions and perusing the original writ petitions and contempt petition, found that the prayers sought by the petitioners in the initial writ petitions had been "crystallized" in the form of its 2011 order.

On the crucial point of alleged contempt regarding the new legislation, the Court firmly rejected the petitioners' argument. It emphasized the plenary powers of a State Legislature to pass enactments. The Court stated:

"The passing of an enactment subsequent to the order of this Court by the legislature of the State of Chhattisgarh cannot, in our view, be said to be an act of contempt of the order passed by this Court. It is observed that every State Legislature has plenary powers to pass an enactment and so long as the said enactment has not been declared to be ultra vires the Constitution or, in any way, null and void by a Constitutional Court, the said enactment would have the force of law."

The Court reiterated the doctrine of separation of powers, stressing that the legislative function includes the power to enact and amend laws. It clarified that an interpretative power of a Constitutional Court does not extend to declaring the exercise of legislative functions as an instance of contempt. Any challenge to a law's validity must be mounted on grounds of legislative competence or constitutional validity, not through a contempt petition.

Regarding the other prayers in the contempt petition, the Court found them to be in the nature of writs of mandamus, which cannot be granted in a contempt proceeding. Consequently, the contempt petition was disposed of.

The Court also noted that compliance reports, as directed in paragraph 96 of the 2011 order, had been submitted by the concerned authorities, addressing that aspect of the previous directives. Finally, the grievance concerning the NHRC's non-response was deemed to no longer survive with the disposal of the main matters.

Conclusion:

With this ruling, the Supreme Court has closed the chapter on these long-running cases, underscoring the distinction between legislative powers and judicial review, and reinforcing the principle that the mere enactment of a law cannot be deemed contempt of court. While the petitioners' concerns regarding rehabilitation and the impact of new legislation were acknowledged, the Court maintained that the initial prayers had been addressed through its previous orders and that further legal recourse, if any, regarding the new Act would need to be pursued through separate challenges to its constitutional validity.