The Supreme Court of India recently in Naushey Ali & Others v/s State of U.P. & Another., quashed criminal proceedings stemming from a 33-year-old FIR, emphasizing the distinction between compounding and quashing, and clarifying the principles governing the quashment of proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, even when Section 307 (attempt to murder) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) is initially invoked.

The case involved a decades-long dispute between residents of the same village, originating from a cross-FIR situation in 1991. Both parties accused each other of assault and other offenses, including attempted murder. While the initial police investigation resulted in a closure report, the trial court rejected it and summoned the accused, including the appellants. After a protracted legal battle, the criminal revision filed by the appellants was dismissed in 2015. The appellants claimed they were unaware of this dismissal until 2022, when they received summons from the trial court.

In the intervening years, the parties, through the intervention of village elders, reached a compromise in 2022. Based on this settlement, the appellants filed an application under Section 482 CrPC before the Allahabad High Court, seeking to quash the proceedings. The High Court, however, dismissed the application, citing the presence of a Section 307 IPC charge and the perceived non-compoundability of such offenses.

The Supreme Court, in its judgment, clarified the difference between compounding an offense (which is governed by specific provisions under Section 320 CrPC) and quashing proceedings under the inherent powers of the High Court (Section 482 CrPC). While compounding is strictly regulated by statute, quashing is a broader power exercised by the High Court to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice.

The Court emphasized that even in cases involving serious offenses like those under Section 307 IPC, quashing is not automatically precluded if the parties have reached a settlement. The Court reiterated the principles laid down in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and Another and subsequent cases, highlighting that while certain heinous offenses cannot be quashed merely due to a settlement, offenses with a predominantly civil flavor, particularly those arising from matrimonial disputes, family disputes, or commercial transactions, can be quashed if the Court is satisfied that doing so would serve the interests of justice.

The Court then addressed the specific issue of Section 307 IPC. It reiterated the principle from State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan and Others that the mere mention of Section 307 IPC in an FIR or charge sheet is not sufficient grounds for refusing to quash proceedings. The Court should examine whether the invocation of Section 307 IPC is genuine or merely a "slant" given to a case of physical altercation. This examination can include considering the nature of the injuries, the weapons used, and other surrounding circumstances, but such an analysis is typically done after investigation and the filing of a charge sheet or during the trial.

Applying these principles to the present case, the Supreme Court noted several key factors: the long lapse of time since the incident, the initial police closure report, the settlement between the parties, the lack of specific allegations against the appellants regarding the Section 307 charge, and the nature of the injuries sustained by the complainant (a finger fracture). The Court concluded that the injuries, even if caused by lathis or iron bars, did not justify a Section 307 charge. It opined that, at most, the offense could fall under Section 326 IPC (voluntarily causing grievous hurt), and that continuing the trial after a settlement would be a futile exercise and an abuse of process.

The Court, therefore, allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order and quashing the criminal proceedings against the appellants. This decision underscores that while Section 307 IPC is a serious charge, its mere presence does not automatically bar the quashment of proceedings, particularly when the allegations are unsubstantiated by the evidence and the parties have reached a settlement. The judgment emphasizes the Court's discretion in balancing the interests of justice and preventing the misuse of criminal proceedings.

 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973