In a clear-cut order dated October 16, 2025, the Supreme Court of India, allowing leave and converting the Special Leave Petition into Civil Appeal No. 12722/2025, set aside an ad-interim stay issued by the High Court of Chhattisgarh. The Apex Court verdict in Puranmal Gupta v. Sumitra Bai strongly reaffirms the compulsive procedural provisions for entertaining and granting interim relief in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
The Procedural Mistake Before Us:
The case came up to the Supreme Court against an interim order issued on June 20, 2025, made by the High Court in Second Appeal No. 336/2025. Issuing notice to the respondent, the High Court went on to stay the operation and effect of a judgment and decree upheld by the First Appellate Court. Importantly, this ad-interim stay was directed without previously framing any substantial question of law.
The High Court's order had restrained the decree issued by the Trial Court and confirmed by the District Judge, subject only to the appellant depositing security of Rs. 25,000/-.
Receding on the Jurisdictional Dictum:
The ARGUED counsel for the Appellant, Mr. Rishi Kapoor, vehemenously contended that the High Court simply could not have granted an ad-interim order in a Second Appeal without following the basic precondition of developing a substantial question of law.
This contention was based on the recent, authoritative ruling of the Supreme Court itself: "U. Sudheera And Others vs. C. Yashoda And Others" [(2025) 4 SCC 215].
The "U. Sudheera" ruling makes it clear that the very jurisdiction of the High Court to even entertain a Second Appeal, much less grant an interim stay, is based on the availability and formulation of a Substantial Question of Law. If this jurisdictional requirement fails, any later interim order stands vitiated.
The Supreme Court's Quick Course Correction:
Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan agreed with the appellant's argument, noting that the challenged interim order was "patently without jurisdiction." This absolute conclusion based directly on the precedent established in U. Sudheera enabled the Bench to set aside the order ex parte, i.e., without serving notice on the respondent. The Court held that as the order in itself lacked jurisdiction, serving notice to defend it would have been a technicality.
The working portion of the order reads:
- "We are of the opinion that we must reserve the impugned order and send back the case to the High Court for consideration afresh in terms of the dictum as enunciated by this Court in 'U. Sudheera' (supra)."
- The issue has now been referred to the Chhattisgarh High Court and it has been requested to hear it afresh on October 27, 2025, to ensure immediate compliance.
This case is a forceful reminder to all practicing attorneys and High Courts as well of the obligatory nature of procedural law. The provision under Section 100 of the CPC—that a Second Appeal will be on a substantial question of law—is not a technicality; it is a gatekeeping jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the ad-interim stay order summarily, has categorically indicated that it shall not tolerate the casual circumvention of this essential procedural requirement. Non-compliance with the U. Sudheera dictum, even in the issuance of interim relief, was viewed as a jurisdictional mistake. The present order is an important safeguard against the exercise of discretion in Second Appeals, reiterating that procedure governs power.
