Supreme Court Upholds Dismissal of Suit Challenging Compromise Decree in Family Property Dispute.


21 April 2025 Civil Appeals >> Civil & Consumer Law   |   Family dispute over inherited property >> Property & Real Estate  

The Supreme Court of India has dismissed an appeal of Manjunath Tirakappa Malagi & Another v/s Gurusiddappa Tirakappa Malagi (Dead Through Lrs)., challenging the concurrent decisions of the Trial Court and the High Court, which had refused to declare a compromise decree in a family property matter as null and void. The case, originating from a suit filed in 2003, involved a dispute over the partition of ancestral property and the validity of a compromise decree entered into between the respondents (defendants).

The appellants, sons of Tirakappa Gurusiddappa Malagi, had initiated the legal battle seeking to invalidate a compromise decree from 2000 and claim a larger share in what they contended was their father's personal property, not ancestral. The crux of their argument was that their father had colluded with their grandfather and uncles to deprive them of their rightful share in a 7-acre land parcel (the suit property). They claimed this land was purchased by their grandmother in their father's name when he was a minor and was thus not part of the ancestral property partitioned in 1974. Consequently, they were not party to the 1999 suit where a compromise decree led to the division of this 7-acre land.


 

 

However, the respondents argued that the appellants' father represented their interests in the 1999 suit. They further contended that the appellants' subsequent suit was barred by the principles of res judicata, Order 2 Rule 2, and Order 23 Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).

After hearing both sides and examining the records, the Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts against the appellants. The Court found that the appellants had failed to prove that the suit property was not part of the ancestral estate. It concurred with the Trial Court's conclusion that despite being purchased in the father's name, the land was acquired using family funds and was therefore joint family property.

The Court noted that the suit property was excluded from the 1974 family partition. Subsequently, the appellants' grandfather filed a suit in 1999 seeking its partition, which resulted in a compromise decree in 2000, equally dividing the land among the grandfather and his six sons, including the appellants' father, who received one acre.

Following this, in 2002, the appellants' own partition suit (filed in 1998) was decreed, granting them collectively half of their father's property share, including his share from the compromise decree (0.5 acres of the suit property). The appellants never challenged this 2002 decree.

The Supreme Court emphasized the legal provisions governing compromise decrees under Order 23 Rule 3 of the CPC, which requires the court to be satisfied that the suit has been adjusted by a lawful compromise before passing a decree. Once such a decree is passed, Section 96(3) of the CPC bars any appeal against it. Furthermore, Order 23 Rule 3A explicitly prohibits filing a fresh suit to set aside a decree on the grounds that the underlying compromise was unlawful.

Referring to its earlier judgment in Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, the Court reiterated that the sole remedy to challenge a consent decree is to approach the court that recorded the compromise and demonstrate that there was no valid compromise. In this case, the appellants' father, who was a party to the compromise decree, never filed a recall application and, in fact, acknowledged its validity.

The Supreme Court also dismissed the appellants' argument regarding the suit property being their father's personal property. The Court stated that if this were true, their father, being alive, would have the right to dispose of it as he wished. Moreover, if the father had no grievance against the compromise decree, the appellants lacked the standing to challenge it.

Finally, the Court agreed with the lower courts that the appellants' suit was also barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of the CPC for not including all relevant properties in their earlier suit and by the principles of res judicata or constructive res judicata, as the issue of partition of the suit property had already been settled in previous litigations.

In light of these findings, the Supreme Court found no reason to interfere with the High Court's order and dismissed the appeal. Any interim orders previously granted were vacated, and pending applications were disposed of accordingly.


Code of Civil Procedure, 1908