Civil Appeals >> Civil & Consumer Law  

The Supreme Court has dismissed an appeal of V.S.R. Mohan Rao v/s K.S.R. Murthy & Others., filed by an individual challenging his designation as a "land grabber" and the subsequent eviction order from a property he claimed to have acquired through a sale deed. The appellant had argued that he was a bona fide purchaser and, at most, a simple trespasser, not subject to the stringent provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982.

The case originated from an application filed before the Special Court under the Land Grabbing Act, where the applicant asserted that 252 square yards of land occupied by the appellant belonged to her, forming part of Survey No. 9. She had purchased this land via a registered sale deed in 1965. The appellant, conversely, claimed to have purchased the land in 1997, with his title tracing back to a Housing Society. He argued that the land he purchased was in Survey No. 10 and that any doubt regarding his title was perfected by adverse possession due to a long-standing two-story building on the property.

Senior Counsel for the appellant contended that for an act to be termed "land grabbing" under the Act, it must involve "obvious criminality and clear mens rea," which she argued was absent in this case. She cited the Supreme Court's decision in Konda Lakshmana Bapuji v. Govt. of A.P. to support the argument for a constricted scope of the Land Grabbing Act, suggesting that a simple trespass should be dealt with in a civil court.

However, the Supreme Court, after reviewing the definitions of "land grabber" and "land grabbing" in the 1982 Act and the Konda Lakshmana Bapuji precedent, affirmed that the Act encompasses both a "narrow and broad meaning" of "grabbing." The Court reiterated that the "mens rea/intention" required is simply that of "illegally taking possession of such lands, through unlawful or arbitrary means." The crucial point is the intention to illegally possess, create third-party rights, or carry out unauthorized constructions.

The Court noted that the applicant had successfully established her ownership of the land in Survey No. 9 through her 1965 deed. Crucially, a court-appointed Commissioner from the Survey Department confirmed that the property occupied by the appellant was indeed in Survey No. 9, not Survey No. 10 as claimed by the appellant. Furthermore, two injunction suits filed by the appellant—one against the applicant and another against the Municipality—had failed. The suit against the applicant was dismissed, and the one against the Municipality was withdrawn when the applicant sought to be impleaded.

Regarding the appellant's claim of adverse possession, the Court found no proof offered as to the commencement and conclusion dates of the construction, thereby weakening the plea of "hostile animus" required for adverse possession.

The Supreme Court concluded that the ingredients for "land grabbing" were sufficiently pleaded and proved by the applicant. The Court found no reason to interfere with the lower court's judgment, emphasizing that the Special Courts under the Land Grabbing Act, despite their specific purpose, function as civil courts, following the Code of Civil Procedure and capable of granting similar reliefs.

The appeal was consequently dismissed, affirming the eviction order against the appellant.